From a cultural-theory perspective, this paper addresses the problem: How does culture affect collaboration in e-government in China? Through a fuzzy-set analysis of culture changes, and four illustrative case studies, it analyses how cultural values behind e-government projects reflect in the type of collaboration adopted, and how particular cultural biases can lead to pathologies such as corruption. The findings are that individualist values play an important role in the e-government value universe, and that the pathologies of the programmes seem related to the prevalent hybrid cultures. This paper reports on early-stage research, conclusions are tentative.
Introduction
The complexity of information systems has made private service providers an integral part of public sector reforms. China's public administration has undergone numerous reforms during the last ten years. Government has become aware that the public administration itself is unable to deliver the service level required by a rapidly expanding economy and a pluralizing society. This is the root of a cultural change taking place in the public sector, moving the boundaries between public and private. The cultural dynamics unfolding within the administrative system are particularly clear in the sphere of e-government, the use of information and communication technology in the public administration. For the last quarter of a century, office automation and networked computing have shaped or enabled changes in public agencies. In itself this technologydriven development reflects choices of how to enact the "affordances" of the new media to solve issues in public administration (Hoff et al. 2000; Orlikowski 2000; Fountain 2001 ). Accordingly, egovernment adoption has played out in different ways across China as local governments possess a certain level of freedom of interpretation of central policy. An experimental approach to government reform has given rise to various local models of development ranging from in-house information system development, over outsourcing, to the use of publicly available commercial platforms (Schlaeger 2013 [forthcoming July] ). This variance in implementation is relevant to examine further to nuance the discussion of collaboration in Chinese public administrative reforms. This paper proposes that "group-grid values" (Hood 1998 ) behind e-government projects reflect in the particular type of collaboration adopted and that different cultural biases lead to different implementation "pathologies" such as corruption, or failures of "think-big projects". Such a connection -if it exists -is important to establish, because it has ramifications for effective implementation. Before embarking on an e-government project, reflexive consideration of the value-orientation of the program can prepare the administration to meet the expected challenges.
The problem addressed by this study is: How does culture affect collaboration in egovernment in China? A basic proposition is that the pathologies along with the selection of form of collaboration are both related to the cultural values in government as illustrated in Figure 2 .
Consequently, to better understand the development of collaboration and corruption, it is expedient to take a step back and analyse their background in cultural-theory terms. By applying the cultural-theory framework to the issue of collaboration in Chinese egovernment, this paper aims to contribute to the discussion of collaboration more generally. The theoretical lens allows a view of collaboration as part of a larger historical development and can point to periods of time and particular localities where increasing fatalism or more egalitarian solutions have been practiced. Through a review of the cultural development within e-government combined with four illustrative cases, this paper makes the claim that different cultural biases affect both public-private collaboration and pathologies of e-government programmes.
Additionally, a purpose of this study is to contribute with a refinement of Hood's public administration version of the cultural-theory framework (Hood 1998) . As theory is the analytical summation of experience, the confrontation with the Chinese empirical data can improve the details of the theory (Lijphart 1971; Cheng and Lu 2009) . Being based on a pilot-study, the ambitions of this paper are, however, more modest, and the primary goal is to move a step closer to delimiting a field of inquiry and formulating a methodology for further research.
To examine how culture affects collaboration in e-government in China, this paper first reviews the literature on collaboration in Chinese e-government. Subsequently, the cultural theory, which is the basis for analysis, is presented and adapted to suit this study, and the methods applied in the pilot-study are described. Then, the development of values within e-government is analyzedthe four cases selected from the pilot-study are used as illustrations of how different cultures affect the collaborative forms of e-government programmes and the pathologies they encounter. In the following section, the findings are discussed. Finally, a brief conclusion summarizes the findings.
Literature Review
The area of outsourcing in e-government is not well researched. In the period from 2006 to 2012 the CNKI-database contains only 91 articles in total and of these merely 19 in the core journals on the topic. In comparison there are more than 18,000 articles in total on e-government. In Chinese e-government, could be the logic assumption, outsourcing is not important. Based on previous work in e-government, however, this would be a misinterpretation of what is going on in practice, where almost all e-government programmes include some kind of collaboration with technical service providers. Instead, the lack of research might reflect that outsourcing is considered as unproblematic as going to a supermarket, performing a market transaction.
The bulk of articles discuss modes of outsourcing and they agree, with an expected bias, that outsourcing is the future development direction for e-government. There are only few articles using cases to analyse the outcomes of outsourcing. Concerning newer models such as build-operatetransfer, build-own-operate, etc., there are so far no articles which move beyond theoretical discussion, and in practice the models are not widely spread in e-government even though examples exist. E-government is currently characterized by three main forms of collaboration. First, there is a processual form where development and maintenance of e-government websites is entrusted to enterprises yet the property right belongs to government. Second, a hybrid form exists where government subordinate public service units or affiliated enterprises take care of design and development and then transfer to government for use. Third, there are innovative forms such as build-operate-transfer, build-own-operate, etc., which are implemented on trial basis in a limited number of cases.
In the context of group-grid theory, the literature provides knowledge of use for further analysis. A number of articles analyse the driving factors that influence decisions to use outsourcing. Government top-down decisions to outsource, they agree, are of key importance, whereas market forces are not mentioned as an important driver. The bias is top-down policy making following an positivist social-engineering logic where policy making is a question of finding the correct, scientific solution to objective, indisputable social problems.
Outsourcing has been taking place in e-government programmes for a number of years, but in an unregulated form. Government agencies can outsource, but they are not allowed to tell anyone that they did so. As a result, in the mid-2000s government often chose to outsource without a binding contract. When such involvement of private actors takes place in an informal way it creates basis for corruption, and consistently academics have raised the argument for more regulation of the area.
On the background of the limited existing literature, it is thus possible to conclude, that a number of different collaborative practices exist within Chinese e-government, that these are not always clearly regulated, and that corrupt practices surround them. Furthermore, the whole field is driven by a top-down logic, where government -and not the market -is the most important driver of reform.
Theory
Culture in this paper is understood by reducing it to two dimensions: group and grid. Group refers to "the extent to which individual choice is constrained by group choice, by binding the individual into a collective body." (Hood 1998: 8) . Grid is "the degree to which our lives are circumscribed by conventions or rules, reducing the area of life that is open to individual negotiation." (Hood 1998: 8) . Accordingly, culture refers to the level of boundedness of rules in a broad sense and the extent to which decisions are made in a group as opposed to individually.
Christopher Hood has distinguished how government can respond in a fatalist, hierarchist, individualist, or egalitarian way to public management disasters (Hood 1998: 24-27) . Based on his cultural-theory framework it can also be assumed different pathologies are particularly likely under different forms of governance. For instance, hierarchy leads to failure of "think-big-projects", fatalism leads to apathy or inertia, egalitarianism strands on unresolved feuds between groups, and individualism leads to fragmentation and corruption (Hood 1998: 27-28) .
We propose that collaboration can take different forms which each fits within a particular cultural orientation. In the literature on collaboration, an often used distinction is between imposed, induced and organically created collaboration. In the cultural-theory framework imposed networks are a result of rules imposed without any personal choice, i.e., high on both group and grid, and hence hierarchical values. Individualist values are, in contrast, the carrying element of the induced collaboration schemes. And organically created collaboration, network based in their cleanest form, belong to an egalitarian value universe. There is a fourth option, the fatalist way, which will, however, in its cleanest form lead to no collaboration, because of mistrust among individuals and hence no desire to work with others. These are ideal types, and hence will not be found in their clean form, but more likely in different combinations. Figure 1 summarizes the hypothesized connection between the four value-sets and collaboration. From this macro perspective it is possible to assess the changes to Chinese administrative culture on a larger scale, and the implications in terms of patterns of collaboration. Second, a contextualized analysis of four cases illustrates the existence of different cultures within e-government. These cases are selected from the larger sample based on their heuristic value to support the claim that it makes sense to talk about different cultures, even within an overall hierarchical setting as the Chinese public administration.
E-government is chosen as a policy area because of its particular cross-cutting character.
Informatization of the public administration takes place across all the administrative silos, so even though it is a relatively distinct policy area it is assumed to reflect a broad range of different cultures within the administration. It is thus possible using a limited sample to gain insight into a wide spectrum of the Chinese public administration. Additionally, e-government presents a "mostlikely" case of collaboration, because the technical demands of establishing new information systems demand expert knowledge. In other countries, expertise and technical know-how in connection with the e-government build-up has to a large extent been summoned through collaboration under different forms (Margetts 1999) . There is nothing to indicate that China should be any different in this aspect, and hence different collaborative practices are expected to flourish.
The case selected is government use of information technology in the period 1988-2013. The time delimitation is chosen to provide a view of the situation before "e-government" as a concept was used in government, which happened around 1998. With a scope that extends before egovernment any changes leading to adoption of the concept become visible. Furthermore, it is an assumption in the literature, that culture changes slowly (Beck Jørgensen 2007) and therefore a longer perspective is needed. The period encompasses the infrastructure build-up with the Golden Programmes prior to 1998.
As the cases are mainly within a hierarchical culture, fuzzy-set analysis was applied, because it allows a graduated distinction within categories instead of a binary coding. The method is inspired by the application by Dunleavy et al. in their analysis of digital era governance (2006: 67) .
Based on the group-grid scores the projects can be classified into the four types of hierarchical, individualist, egalitarian, and fatalist mentioned above. Then, the validity of the assumption that different pathologies are particularly likely under different forms of governance can be tested against the available evidence from existing studies of implementation of e-government programmes in China. Based on the premise that the cultural orientations in their ideal typical form are mutually exclusive we can maintain that the set score is kept within one, so that for instance a score of 1 in hierarchy means that the observed case resembles the ideal type of hierarchy without any confounding elements of individualism, fatalism, or egalitarianism. Further variables include the project name, the year of inauguration, the problem identified by decision makers, the response in terms of concrete measures, and finally the sources for data collection. The coding scheme is presented in Appendix 1.
Illustration of culture change in Chinese e-government
Culture change in the Chinese e-government has taken place over more than 20 years, but increasingly complex hybrid forms are becoming more common with time. In the following, the long-run changes are first assessed through a fuzzy-set coding of data from previous studies. Then, four cases are analysed ranging from the Golden Card Project (in the time before Internet) over Government online (enter the Internet), through a paradigm of e-public affairs with participation, to official microblogging. These cases illustrate cultural hybrids in practice.
The main observations from the study about the historical development of e-government culture generally places us firmly within the hierarchical mode during the entire period, in fact, there is even an increasing tendency, which is caused by a high degree of central government control of the core development programmes such as the "Golden Projects". Hence, to a high extent this was a top-down reform, but the implementation relied on banks to issue IC-cards and install or update automatic teller machines (Zhang 2002) .
Consequently, the implementation depended on collaboration between government and the banks, both national and commercial. The banks were not autonomous, but had to follow standards laid out by the Golden Card Leadership Group, a cross-ministerial task-force specifically targeting this project (Zhang 2002) . The collaboration was imposed, because standards were set from the central government ministries. Even so, banks were interested in the general idea of credit cards.
Such a 'think big' project as the Golden Card would, according to the culture-theory be in danger of a collapse. However, the Golden Card avoided major disasters (Wu 2005) . Characteristic of the project is the high degree of other actors in the implementation process which reflects not hierarchy but individualism in the form of involvement of market actors, the banks. This would lead to an expectation of corruption, and this to some extent happened, as banks leveraged high fees for use of the IC-cards, something which the central government in 1997 and 2000 regulated. Some localities lacked regulations, investments in new systems were uncoordinated leading to duplication, and too many cards were put in circulation by the banks (Zhang 2002) . Government organizations had their own agenda and demanded "entrance fees" for access to the systems and illegal user fees, examples of corruption under some form. The existing hierarchical governance mechanisms were insufficient to regulate these kinds of illegal activities (Zhang 2002 ).
Case 2: Government Online Project -Fatalism
The Government Online Project in 1998 inaugurated the era of e-government in China. The main goal of this project was to get all government organizations online with their own website to create a virtual face of government (Qiu and Hachigian 2005) . The year 1999 was officially declared the "e-government year" as a signal from the central government to all levels of government to pay attention to the implementation of the Government Online Project.
At the strategic level, the project culture was a hybrid of hierarchy and individualism not unlike the Golden Card Project, as it was a top-down initiative from central government and supported by a broad range of ministries. The implementation of the project involved units at all levels of government. However, not only government actors played a role, but also the communications giant China Telecom was an important piece of the strategic development (Lovelock and Ure 2002) .
In the local level government organizations, however, there was none, or as little as possible collaboration. Outsourcing took place based on the idea that buying a website is like going to the supermarket, a market transaction. The process was to purchase a standard website, registering a domain, uploading some news and information, and then no further action was taken .
In fact, at the local level the culture might better be described as fatalism. Local governments adopted e-government in name more than in substance by opening websites that served mainly to fulfil performance criteria of their superiors but basically striving for "business as usual" constricted by the standard operating procedures of the organizations. The outcome of the fatalistic approach led to a high degree of inertia in implementation, which can be seen from the relatively low general level of functionality on the websites even several years later (Qiang 2007: 95-96 ).
The pathologies observed were related to fragmentation of the implementation apparatus. In spite of the efforts to standardize websites and computer systems, the result of the government online project was the creation of "isolated information islands" [xinxi dudao], referring to incompatible information systems that did not integrate into a larger information ecology. Multiple dynamics led to this outcome, but here it is sufficient to conclude that it was not a failure of one big project as much as it was the failure of a complex constellation of government and private actors set free to find their own solutions. Fragmentation was the result, as would be predicted by cultural theory when an individualistic culture plays a large role.
Furthermore, there is evidence of symbolic implementation or hypocrisy during the government online project. When analyses apply the triad of hierarchy, market, and network the fourth option, that of inertia or inaction, does not show clearly. However as illustrated above, it is an important part of Chinese e-government. It would be misleading to characterize it as hierarchy, because even though the top-levels define it in such a way, it is obvious that the interpretation of what has to be implemented is not shared by the lower levels.
Here is a potential need to refine the theory, because in China the many levels of government complicate processes of governance as generally acknowledged within China studies (Lieberthal 1995; Saich 2004) . We can in this case see an illustration of how the hierarchical culture at the central level meets a local level where the response is "enthusiastic fatalism".
Case 3: E-Public Affairs -Egalitarianism
In the year 2006 a new concept of "e-public affairs" [dianzi gongwu] surfaced in the academic literature on e-government (Li et al. 2006) . This is different from the previous two cases, because it did not become mainstream government policy.
Culturally, the e-public affairs model was a reaction to the strong top-down government focus in the e-government literature, and it suggested that government could and should not produce all public goods by itself (Li et al. 2006) . Instead, businesses and citizens or non-governmental organizations should be allowed to take their part. This idea, with its foundation in multri-centric governance, comes close to egalitarian values.
The idea was to create a new kind of e-government based on collaboration in networks.
There was no questioning of government authority implied, and the purpose is to deliver services and public goods -not political participation. There was thus a top-down bias to this kind of collaboration as well, the model was hence overall comfortably within a hierarchical culture.
However, there are also very clear marks of an egalitarian culture, lower on the grid values -the rule boundedness -as the model was open to, for instance, non-governmental organizations suggesting provision of a public service and finding a way to provide it, eventually supported by a business enterprise. Not only is the idea of e-public affairs interesting because of its challenge to existing values in the public administration, equally interesting is it that it illustrates a Chinese speciality, namely scholars who come up with a new governance model and then selected government agencies adopt it on a trial basis. Sometimes it succeeds, as for instance digital urban management (Song and Cornford 2006) , and sometimes the projects are not convincing to the political decision makers. This kind of academic-government collaboration should have particular attention in the Chinese case, as it may induce dynamics of collaboration that are not theorized in a Western context.
In this case, the cultural theory would expect that internal feuds either in the academic world or in among the agencies in Beijing, who were going to pilot the projects, to be the cause of "disaster". The e-public affairs model was tentatively used in a few trial cases in Beijing. They were more top-down oriented than the theoretical model had asked for, and apparently, they did not work very well or at least, not to the liking of the authorities. They were not rolled out on a larger scale.
The year 2008 was the high tide of e-public affairs but later years saw only very few publications and no further examples of adoption in practice. This is an interesting story about an idea that did not have its time, and maybe it shows something about the limits to collaboration in China. Much further work is, however, needed to make such conclusions. Collaboration exists to a high degree, as government uses the commercial platforms "for free". With more than 175,000 official microblogs registred across the four major platforms Sina, Tencent, Xinhua, and People's Daily, government is a big user of these free online services (NSG 2013) . From the perspective of collaboration it is highly relevant to examine how the role of government in this case has changed from a top-down policy maker who regulates implementers (for instance the banks in the Golden Card case), and into becoming the user of a commercial service. To be authorised in the microblog environment government even has to apply for authentication by the service provider. The individualism in this case seems to have come so far as to challenge the hierarchical values as the most important.
Official microblogging has clear individualist traits, and hence corruption would be the pathology immediately expected by cultural theory. Corruption in this case can for instance be if the private service providers exploit the user data amassed on their network as part of the interactions between government and citizens. Strictly speaking, government agrees to a set of rules set by the private service provider in order to use the service, and this means that the use data is the property of the service provider. Government employees lament the lack of access to detailed use statistics.
They are instead presented with some relatively crude summaries of use statistics which are not sufficient for improving their services (Schlaeger and Jiang 2013) .
Fatalist values, the desire to stick to the standard operating procedures, also to some extent show in the local government approach to microblogging, which on one hand is guided by a feeling that it is a new medium of large importance and something the public administration has to adapt to in some way. On the other hand, there is no common strategy for development, it is thus adopted on the local level by individual level initiative more than institutionalized responses (Schlaeger and Jiang 2013) . The approach is thus more wait-and-see than an active adoption. In this way it reflects elements of the government online project, something they have to do, but prefer to do without changing work processes.
Discussion
The pilot-study of the culture changes within e-government shows an increasing plurality of values reflected within the programmes. The move towards more individualism whether in the form of New Public Management or joined-up governance (which is still a top-down venture in the Chinese context) is not surprising and has been identified in previous research as well (Zhu 2008 ).
The fuzzy-set methods applied in this paper, nevertheless allow a more nuanced analysis which in combination with the cultural theory has potential for use in the administration. For instance, analysing a programme one may find that values are mixed and pose the questions: Is it sustainable? What are the potential pathologies?
From the birds-eye view of the development, the analysis zoomed in on four selected cases to show that all the different cultural orientations exist under some form within Chinese e-government. The contextualized descriptions of the cases, seen under one, allow for a number of propositions, which can be used in further inquiry.
First, it is impossible to identify any completely ideal typical cultural form. Instead all the projects show different degrees of hybridity which is, nevertheless, firmly grounded in an overall hierarchical value universe. Analysis must take this into account, why we suggest the coding following group-grid with scores from 0-1 in increments of 0.25, because it allows for a more nuanced mapping of the e-government projects in China. In Chinese e-government the main cultural value is related to hierarchy. Nevertheless, as illustrated by the four cases in this paper, other cultural elements can be traced and the problems or pathologies that arise in these cases seem to confirm the expectations based on the cultural-theory framework. The findings are summarized in Figure 3 . Second, even from the first informatization projects, such as the Golden Card, collaboration has been instrumental to implementation. In the beginning very much top-down controlled, more recently however, in forms where the actual impulse for government action comes from market pressures, pressures from e-commerce. In spite of the obvious importance of collaboration within the field of e-government it is not well researched in the Chinese context. Here is an opportunity for Chinese government to learn from foreign literature and expertise. Chinese scholars could increase focus on the area, in particular in terms of studies of existing programmes to learn from experience and develop new theory. E-government has been described as an "architecture of control" (Kluver 2005 ) and accordingly the expectation would be that government maintains a firm grip on the development, including eventual collaborative models. The cultural theory, however, would nuance this expectation so that government is expected to choose a mode of control in line with the existing cultural bias at the given time (Hood 1998: 234) which could be for instance oversight (hierarchical) or competition (individualist). The proposed project therefore proposes to integrate and adapt the cultural theory into the Chinese context to gain a better understanding of collaboration in e-government.
This pilot-study analysed second-hand data from published articles as a meta-analysis of the status and development of collaboration in Chinese e-government. Considering the small number of articles on the topic, the conclusions would benefit from further empirical inquiry. In particular, the need for additional work arises, because the majority of articles on the topic do not evaluate or discuss existing outsourcing solutions, but instead propose new models of outsourcing based on logic argumentation rather than empirical evidence. Consequently, the way forward is to generate a data set on collaboration in e-government. Whereas the findings are illustrative more than definitive, it is, nonetheless, the hope that the understanding of collaboration in a cultural context can increase the chances that new e-government projects are formulated in a way fitting reasonably with the existing value context and prepared for the foreseeable disasters.
Conclusion
How does culture affect collaboration? E-government's "way of life" is changing, even if ever so incrementally. A culture change from hierarchical towards inclusion of individualist values is taking place in the Chinese public sector moving the boundary between public and private. On this background, the contingency of choosing particular forms of collaboration as a response to public administrative issues should be highlighted. The "wicked issues" of public administration can be solved by different forms of collaboration, and behind each is a set of values shaping both the form of collaboration and the pathologies related to it. The cases in this paper, even the Golden Card Project which was a top-down programme, exhibit a large degree of collaboration during implementation. However, it was also evident, that implementation was flawed by the failure of government to recognize the potential problems of embracing an individualist culture and choosing to involve private actors in the implementation. This paper provides an analytical lens which enables a view of policy programmes asking more broadly which forms of collaboration are possible, which are feasible in the given cultural context, and which pathologies are predictable.
The conclusion of this paper should be considered illustrative more than definitive. To attain the latter quality, more empirical work is needed.
